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Many developing countries have attempted to pursue the East Asian growth model in recent 
decades. This model is widely perceived to have been based on export-led growth. Given 
that developed countries are likely to grow at a slower rate and be less willing to run trade 
deficits in the post-financial-crisis world, can this growth model be sustained? Using panel 
data for Asian countries, this paper contributes to addressing this question by distinguishing 
between different kinds of export- and tradable-led growth in order to more precisely identify 
the nature of growth in the pre-crisis decades. We find in particular that, among our variables 
of interest, the proportion of a country's manufactured exports that is destined for 
industrialized countries is the one most robustly associated with output growth. The results 
have implications for continued post-crisis growth in Asian developing countries. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Economic Growth is perhaps the foremost goal of policymakers across the world. In 
pursuing this objective, strategies have varied across and within countries across time. 
One such strategy—export-led growth—has been most directly associated with East 
Asian countries in recent decades. As we will see shortly, while the term export-led 
growth could have more than one interpretation, the common thread uniting these is the 
hypothesis that either exports or net
The original larger East Asian “tigers”—the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China—are 
widely believed to have pursued import substitution policies in the earlier phases of their 
rapid growth (in the 1950s and 1960s), followed by export promotion beginning in the 
latter half of the 1960s.
 exports (i.e., trade surpluses) cause growth.  
1 Indeed, according to numerous scholars the pursuit of export 
promotion rather than import substitution is what has distinguished East Asian export 
performance from that of other less-successful developing countries.
2 This model of 
export-led growth in recent years appears to have become a desirable template for 
many developing countries across the globe. In particular, relatively rapid growth along 
with current account surpluses in developing countries (especially in Asia) following the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the global recession in 2001 generated 
considerable interest in the potential of export-led growth. Figure 1 illustrates the 
weighted current account as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) for the 19 




Unprecedented growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) along with its 
accumulation of record amounts of foreign exchange reserves have only served to 
confirm the perceived efficacy of such a growth strategy. 
                                                 
1See, for example, Weiss (2005). 
2See, for example, Bhagwati (1990). 
3The current account to GDP ratio was obtained for 1999–2009 from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade  and Development (UNCTAD) COMTRADE  database for 2010 and from the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Source OECD database for 2010. The annual weights 
assigned to each developed country for calculating the annual weighted current account to GDP ratio 
were based on the share of total manufactured exports to developed countries from the 44  Asian 
countries in our sample that went to that particular country that year.  In other words, we weigh the 
industrialized countries according to their importance as export destinations for Asian countries. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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Figure 1: Weighted Current Account as a Proportion of Gross Domestic Product 
for the 19 Industrialized Countries in Our Sample, 1999–2010 
 
Source: United Nations COMTRADE (2011) and authors’ calculations 
Critics, however, have pointed out that the existence of a fallacy of composition or 
adding-up constraint undermines the sustainability and/or universal applicability of such 
a strategy. For one country to export more, at least one other country has to import 
more. A simultaneous pursuit of export-led growth by all developing countries, especially 
if concentrated in a similar range of manufactured products, could only be successful if 
demand from developed countries grows at a corresponding pace and/or if the terms of 
trade move against the growing countries, thus increasing competitiveness in an 
imperfect substitutes framework.4 Moreover, if the aim is to achieve growth in net
The recent global financial crisis has served to highlight the adding-up constraint. This 
constraint becomes even more relevant if, as is widely expected, developed countries 
grow at a slower pace or are less willing to run trade deficits following the recent global 
financial crisis. Put differently, shrinking global imbalances in the near future may make it 
much harder, if not impossible, for a large group of developing countries to pursue 
growth based on exporting to developed countries. Indeed, another look at Figure 1 
indicates that current account imbalances have begun to shrink since the onset of global 
economic difficulties in 2007. However, others such as Rodrik (2009) have noted that 
Asian growth successes were based on broader tradable sector growth rather than 
solely on exports. Before we can evaluate prospects for the future, therefore, it would be 
 
exports, then such a strategy requires that developed countries run corresponding trade 
deficits, which beyond some point may become unsustainable. Thus, the strategy of 
export-led growth, when universally followed by developing countries, is likely to yield 
diminishing returns. 
                                                 
4Barring the unlikely case where developing-country products are perfect substitutes for developed-country 
products, or where there is complete pass-through of exchange rate changes into developing-country 
export prices when measured in domestic currency terms, a devaluation will translate into a deterioration 
in the terms of trade. In logical terms, the simultaneous pursuit of export-led growth by a number of small 
developing countries becomes analogous to the large-country case. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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helpful to evaluate the past. In particular, we need to clarify terms such as “export-led 
growth” and “tradable-led growth.” 
The term export-led growth has traditionally been understood in a Keynesian framework, 
whereby positive  net exports or trade surpluses generate a source of demand for 
domestic output, and hence cause output growth. It is in this sense that the idea of an 
adding-up constraint makes sense. A logical corollary is that slower growth of demand 
and greater reluctance to run trade deficits in developed countries will make it harder for 
developing countries to pursue this kind of a growth strategy. We will call this strategy 
the net export-led growth (NEXLG) strategy. A related strand in the post-Keynesian 
tradition, that originated with Thirlwall (1979), points to the role of the balance of 
payments constraint in limiting output growth. Thus, while trade is assumed to be 
balanced in the long run, exports play the crucial role of facilitating growth by relaxing 
the balance of payments constraint. Relaxation of this constraint, in turn, facilitates 
imports of the investment and intermediate goods required for output growth. To the 
extent that trade surpluses or limited trade deficits must precede
As discussed in the next section, a more recent strand of literature, inspired in large part 
by Melitz (2003), has emphasized the role of exports as harbingers of productivity 
growth. The hypothesis is that greater international competition, international knowledge 
spillovers, economies of scale, and other relevant externalities make exports a vehicle 
for technological change and, hence, economic growth. What makes exports special in 
this case is not any external-account-related consideration but rather the presence of 
externalities associated with the process of exporting. Thus, the emphasis shifts to 
supply-side factors. Since the kinds of externalities discussed above are generally 
associated with manufactured exports, we refer to this hypothesis as the manufactured 
export-led growth (MEXLG) strategy.  
 growth, the implications 
are similar to those underlying the NEXLG strategy. 
Another distinct hypothesis is that of what we call tradable-sector-led growth (TSLG). 
Rodrik (2008), for example, argues that two features are pervasive in many developing 
countries: (i) institutional weaknesses in the contracting environment, and (ii) market 
failures. The tradable sector, which in developing countries is associated mainly with 
manufactures, is typically afflicted with these handicaps to a greater extent, leading to 
these countries devoting a suboptimal proportion of their resources to this sector. 
Second-best policies to subsidize tradable production, therefore, could promote growth.5
Finally, a consideration that has received much less attention is the possibility that all 
exports may not be created equal. Insofar as knowledge spillovers, technology transfer, 
and adoption of new management techniques are more likely to result from 
manufactured exports to developed countries, growth may also potentially be a function 
of the proportion of a country's manufactured exports destined for industrialized-country 
markets. Developed-country firms may, in addition, pursue vertical foreign direct 
investment in developing countries with low labor costs in order to use them as platforms 
for relatively sophisticated exports to industrialized countries. This will facilitate 
technology transfer and productivity growth. We refer to this as the industrialized-
country-centered export-led growth (IEXLG) strategy. 
  
The four above-mentioned growth strategies have different implications for the post-
crisis prospects of developing countries. In particular, the degree to which a global 
                                                 
5See also Razmi, Rapetti, and Skott (2011) for a model of an economy that features tradable-led growth in 
an environment of underemployment of labor resources. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
                                                                                                          
 
6 
environment in which trade imbalances shrink could hamper a continuation of pre-crisis 
growth strategies depends on the nature of these strategies. Table 1 lays out a 
schematic summary of these implications. The NEXLG strategy will face greater adding-
up constraints in a post-crisis world if global growth is slower, and if developed countries 
experience smaller trade deficits. The MEXLG and TSLG strategies, by contrast, may 
not face that constraint since external imbalances are not a factor. Thus, the distinction 
between NEXLG on the one hand and TSLG and MEXLG on the other becomes an 
interesting issue. Moreover, the distinction between NEXLG and TSLG renders the 
composition of demand for domestic tradables important. For example, if there is 
something special about exports, then lowering wages may help the pursuit of the 
MEXLG strategy by freeing up domestic tradables for export. If, on the other hand, it is 
the entire tradable industrial sector that is special, then lowering wages would simply 
shift the composition of demand from domestic to foreign sources or, in the event that 
foreign  demand does not displace domestic demand, may even hamper growth by 
lowering demand for domestically produced tradables. 6 Finally, the fact that it is 
the industrialized
Table 1: Different Growth Strategies 
 countries that are expected to shrink their overall trade deficits in the 
post-crisis world has an interesting implication for the post-crisis world. Since positive 
net exports provide a boost to demand regardless of destination, at least some 
developing countries could continue pursuing NEXLG by substituting trade surpluses 
with other developing countries for those with developed countries. However, if the 
destination matters (because, say, exports to developed countries bring with them more 
knowledge spillovers and technological improvements to meet higher product 
standards), then lower export growth to these countries will hamper continuation of the 
MEXLG strategy. 
 Strategy 
Shrinking trade deficits 
necessarily
Shrinking industrialized country 
demand   bad  necessarily bad 
Tradable-led growth (TSLG)  No  No 
Net export-led growth (NEXLG)  Yes  No 
Export-led growth     
Driven by manufactured exports 
(MEXLG) 
No  No 
Driven by exports to industrialized 
countries (IEXLG) 
No  Yes 
Source: authors 
In summary, developing Asia can continue to pursue TSLG but not NEXLG in a world 
with zero global imbalances. Similarly, a region that has pursued MEXLG will not be 
affected in a post-crisis world characterized by zero imbalances if that state is arrived at 
through higher imports into that region, but it will be negatively affected if that state is 
achieved via reduced exports to the rest of the world. To take another example, a group 
of developing countries will be affected negatively by slower developed-country growth 
                                                 
6This could happen if, for example, the propensity to save out of profits is higher than that out of wages, as 
is often assumed in the Kaleckian framework. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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in a post-crisis world if that group pursued IEXLG, but not necessarily if it pursued 
MEXLG and can replace exports to industrialized countries with exports to other 
developing countries. 
This paper empirically investigates the future of pre-crisis growth strategies by 
attempting to identify the nature of those strategies. Specifically, we try to 
econometrically distinguish between NEXLG, MEXLG, IEXLG, and TSLG using panel 
data for pre-crisis years. Given that export-led growth among noncommodity exporters is 
mainly associated with Asian countries—and East and Southeast Asian countries in 
particular—we focus on these countries.  
We contribute to the existing literature on export-led growth and global rebalancing by 
distinguishing between these four growth strategies, identifying the historically most 
relevant ones for Asia, and thereby drawing conclusions for the future. Most 
interestingly, perhaps, we find that the proportion of a developing Asian country's exports 
that are destined for industrialized countries has a statistically robust positive effect on 
output growth, and that this positive effect may work through investment and imports of 
capital goods. This variable as a determinant of growth has not to our knowledge 
received much attention in existing literature. 
Section 2 provides an overview of the main issues and related literature. Sections 3 and 
4 develop the empirical strategy and present the econometric estimates. Section 5 
concludes. 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The recent international financial crisis has served as a big shock to the global trade and 
financial architecture. As illustrated by Figure 2, Asian countries in particular enjoyed 
rapid growth and trade surpluses in the years leading up to the crisis. Due to the 
unbalanced nature of our panel, we display the means of our variables of interest.
7
                                                 
7More details about the composition of our sample are in section 3. 
 The 
figure highlights the trade surpluses that accompanied growth following the Asian crisis 
of the late 1990s. Also interesting is the upward evolution since the late 1970s of 
manufactured exports as a proportion of GDP and that of the proportion of manufactured 
exports destined for industrialized countries. The size of the industry sector as a 
proportion of GDP has, on the other hand, stayed more or less the same since the mid-
1980s. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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Figure 2: Mean of Real per Capita Gross Domestic Product and Other Variables for 
Asian Countries, 1950–2007 
 
Source: Penn World Table (2011), United Nations COMTRADE (2011), World Development Indicators (2011), 
and authors’ calculations 
The rapid growth in the years leading up to 2007 was widely perceived as having been 
based on surging exports. Especially impressive in this regard has been the sustained 
growth in the PRC over the last three decades, which has occurred alongside huge 
current account surpluses in recent years. The logical corollary is that, given that 
developed countries are likely to grow at a slower pace following the crisis, and that 
countries with big deficits will increasingly resort to direct or indirect protectionist 
measures, the pre-crisis model of growth based on exporting manufactures to developed 
countries may have outlived its utility.
8
Discussion of the sustainability of the growth model cannot be separated from that of the 
nature of the growth model. Traditionally, export-led growth has been interpreted to 
mean trade surplus growth or growth led by net exports. Net exports serve as a source 
of demand for domestic output and, hence, in a demand-led growth framework, as a 
source of growth. The origins of the idea can of course be traced back to mercantilist 
literature from the pre-industrial-revolution era. In its more modern form, it is most 
closely associated with the Keynesian framework of demand-led growth.  
  
The conception of export-led growth based on trade surpluses is subject to the fallacy of 
composition or adding-up critique that becomes particularly relevant in the post-crisis 
world where a shortage of international demand originating from developed countries is 
likely. Such a constraint could either show up in the crowding out of some countries' 
exports by other countries or, relatedly, in deteriorating terms of trade for developing-
                                                 
8See, for example, the discussions in UNCTAD (2010) and Adams and Park (2009). ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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country exporters. Evidence on the existence of a fallacy of composition has thus far 
been suggestive although not conclusive. For example, based on panel data estimates 
for 22 major developing-country exporters of manufactures, Razmi (2007) finds the 
presence of significant demand-side constraints on export growth. Furthermore, the 
estimates suggest that rapid export growth in the PRC has had a significant impact in 
this regard. Eichengreen, Rhee, and Tong (2007) confirm the tendency for the PRC's 
exports to crowd out those of other Asian countries but find a difference in the impact of 
the PRC on low-income versus middle-  and high-income Asian countries. This is 
because the effect is felt mainly in markets for consumer goods which are exported by 
lower-income Asian countries. The PRC's simultaneous tendency to absorb large 
volumes of capital good imports from its Asian neighbors, on the other hand, has 
benefited the more advanced Asian economies. 
A different basis for export-led growth was offered by a strand of literature following 
Feder (1983). This literature has developed the theoretical underpinnings for the 
inclusion of exports as an explanatory variable in a traditional growth framework with a 
production function. In Feder's two-sector model, the output of the non-export sector 
depends not only on the factors of production (labor and capital) but also on exports. 
This captures the externality associated with factors unique to exports such as higher-
quality labor and internationally competitive management. Moreover, the marginal 
product of factors in the export sector is greater than that in the non-export sector. Thus, 
from this perspective exports can potentially influence productivity and growth 
independently of their impact on the external balance. 
More recently, several studies following Melitz (2003) have analyzed the relationship 
between firm heterogeneity, trade, and exports at a more micro level. A relevant 
empirical finding is that exporting firms tend, on average, to be larger and more 
productive than non-exporting firms. This suggests either that more-productive firms self-
select into export markets (due to extra costs imposed by the process of exporting) 
and/or that firms that export become more productive. Firms may become more 
productive because of several reasons, such as economies of scale, learning, 
technological spillovers, and competitive pressures. Pack (2001), for example, notes that 
international competition allowed purchasers abroad to exert heavy pressure on East 
Asian exporters producing under contract to cut costs and increase efficiency. Exporting 
firms may have easier access to new technologies because of their international links. 
Moreover, exporting firms may receive technical guidance on how to meet higher-quality 
standards from their clients in importing countries. Again, Pack notes that export-
oriented production encouraged East Asian countries to move toward more 
sophisticated technology to meet the complex contractual requirements from Western 
industrial countries. Easier transfer of managerial skills may also be a factor. While 
empirical evidence for self-selection  tends to be  quite robust, that for learning-by-
exporting appears to be significant only for developing countries. This is not surprising 
since these countries tend to be further from the technological frontier, and hence have 
greater scope for learning. 
Other recent studies have also pointed to the potentially special nature of exports. For 
example, Cypher and Dietz (2008) provide a discussion of the domestic technological 
learning capacity that arises from exporting manufactures. In an econometric study of 
nine African countries, Van Biesebroeck (2005) finds evidence of manufactured exports 
resulting in productivity growth. The study shows that the presence of scale economies 
plays an important role in this regard. Credit constraints and contract enforcement issues 
prevent firms that only produce for the domestic market from fully exploiting this channel. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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These problems are likely to be more relevant for developing countries, as are the 
potential gains from imitation.
9
The special nature of the tradable sector, which in developing countries consists mainly 
of the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, need not be limited to exports, however. 
Rodrik (2008) presents an endogenous growth model in which the tradable sector is 
special in the sense that it is characterized to a greater degree by institutional 
weaknesses and market failures (information and coordination externalities), leading to a 
bias against this sector in the allocation of resources. A subsidy, say in the form of 
exchange rate undervaluation, boosts profits in the tradable sector and the resulting 
sector reallocation raises the growth rate.  
 
In a recent paper that perhaps comes closest to the spirit of our paper, Rodrik (2009) 
tests the tradable-led and the export-led growth hypotheses by running a comparison 
between the industry share of GDP (used as a proxy for the size of the tradable sector) 
and the exports–GDP ratio on the one hand, and the industry share of GDP and trade 
surpluses as a proportion of GDP on the other. The panel data consists of both 
developed and developing countries. The paper finds evidence that the industry share of 
GDP  matters more, especially for developing countries. However, since it is 
manufactured exports that are more likely to be the source of learning and knowledge 
spillovers, the manufactured exports to GDP ratio seems to be the more relevant 
variable, and this is the variable that we employ in our analysis. 
Finally, we end this section with a brief look at another issue that is directly relevant to 
post-crisis prospects for developing countries. Some literature has suggested that 
emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere have decoupled from the developed world 
and are, therefore, immune to slower growth in the developed world. Noting the growth 
in South–South trade, Canuto, Haddad, and Hanson  (2010) discuss the possible 
evolution of a new version of export-led growth, in which South–South trade picks up the 
slack through middle-income countries importing more from low-income ones. The 
authors term this scenario “export-led growth v2.0.” This, however, raises a new set of 
questions. Since it is the developed countries that are expected to limit their trade 
deficits in the post-crisis years, is there anything  special  about exporting to these 
countries? In other words, is learning-by-exporting more significant in the case of (i) 
exports to developed countries, perhaps due to the presence of more stringent product 
quality expectations; (ii) a greater proportion of more-sophisticated manufactured 
products in the basket; (iii) more technical guidance from client firms; or (iv) other 
factors? Indeed, existing literature does provide some supportive evidence in this regard. 
For example, De Loecker (2007) finds that productivity gains from exporting are greater 
for firms exporting to high-income countries.
10
                                                 
9 De Loecker (2007) finds in an empirical study of the Slovenian manufacturing sector that export entrants 
become more productive once they start exporting. In a study of British manufacturing firms, Greenaway 
and Kneller (2007)  find that exporting firms  experience productivity growth relative to non-exporters. 
Moreover, the magnitude of divergence across industries appears to be driven by differences in the scope 
for learning. For example, the export effect is greater if the distance to the technological frontier is large. 
Thus, the export effect should generally be larger for low-income countries. Among other recent studies, 
see also Hiep and Ohta (2009) for the case of manufacturing firms in Viet Nam, Mahadevan (2007) for 
Malaysia, Ogunleye and Ayeni (2008) for Nigeria, and Park et al. (2009) for the PRC. Wagner (2007), 
Pedro and Yang (2009), and Silva et al. (2010) present comprehensive surveys of studies of the learning-
by-exporting channel. Lall (1998,  2000)  provides  insightful discussions of the nexus between 
manufacturing exports and development in developing countries from a more macro perspective. 
 If this is the case, (post-crisis) export-led 
10See also Pedro and Yang (2009) and Silva et al. (2010). ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
                                                                                                          
 
11 
growth v2.0, which involves other developing countries replacing developed countries as 
export destinations, may not be a good substitute for (pre-crisis) export-led growth v1.0.  
We probe these issues empirically in the next section. 
3.  DATA AND ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY 
We begin with a baseline regression of the following form: 









f f Developed X proportion
GDP prop TB GDP X Manuf































      (1) 
The dependent variable is the average annual rate of real (chained) GDP per capita 
growth,  1 − it RGDPCH  (real GDP per capita in the previous period) captures the 
convergence term,  t f  captures time-specific effects,  j f
 captures country-specific 
effects, and  it ε  is the error term. Real GDP growth was obtained from Penn World Table 
(2011). The GDP share of industry is denoted by GDP prop Industry _ _ . Following 
Rodrik (2009), among other studies, we use this as a proxy for the size of the tradable 
sector. The variable  GDP prop TB _ _  represents the trade balance as a proportion of 
GDP, and captures the effects of net exports on  growth. Manufactured exports, i.e., 
exports of categories 5–8 in the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), as a 
proportion of GDP are represented by the variable  GDP X Manuf _ _ . Data for these 
four variables were obtained from World Development Indicators (2011). Finally, 
Developed X proportion _ _  is the proportion of manufactured exports destined for 
developed countries. Data for the construction of this variable were obtained from United 
Nations COMTRADE (2011). 
Our sample consists of a maximum of 44 Asian developing countries, 20 industrialized 
countries, and the time period 1953–2009, although data are available for shorter 
intervals for some of the series. To remove short-run cyclical effects, we use data 
averaged over 3-year intervals.11
                                                 
11Ideally we would have liked to use 5-year periods but the sample size constrains our choice. The 3-year 
average  for 
 Table 2 provides a data dictionary along with a list of 
the Asian and developed countries included in the sample. We pursue a general-to-
specific estimation strategy, which is particularly useful given our limited sample size. In 
each case, we first estimate the most general form based on equation 1. The variables 
that are not significant at the 10% level are then eliminated in a stepwise manner. 
GRGDPCH , a variable in growth rate form, was calculated using the following formula: 
1 )] 3 / 1 ( )^ / [( 1 − = − t t RGDPCH RGDPCH GRGDPCH
.  ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                                 Razmi and Hernandez 
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Table 2: Data and Sample Definitions 
 
Code  Definition  Source  Coverage 
GRGDPCH  Growth rate of (chained) real GDP per capita  PWT 7.0  1950–2009 
RGDPCH  Real GDP chain per capita  PWT 7.0  1950–2009 
Industry_prop_GDP  Industry value added (% of GDP)  WDI  1960–2009 
Manuf_X_GDP  Manufactured exports (% of GDP). Calculations based on manufactured exports (% of 
merchandise exports), merchandise exports (current US$), and GDP (current US$) 
Authors' calculations 
based on WDI 
1960–2009 
TB_prop_GDP  External balance on goods and services (% of GDP)  WDI  1960–2009 
proportion_X_Developed  Manufactured exports (SITC 5–8) to developed countries as a proportion of manufactured 
exports to world 
UN COMTRADE  1962–2010 
GFCF_prop_GDP  Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  WDI  1960–2009 
K_prop_Total_imports  Capital goods imports (SITC 7, -73 (transportation equipment),+86 (scientific and professional 
equipment) as a proportion of total imports 
UN COMTRADE  1962–2010 
CONINDEX  Export concentration index (Herfindahl–Hirschmann index)  UNCTAD  1980–2009 
Developed countries  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and 
US 
   
Asian developing 
economies 
Afghanistan; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Bhutan; Brunei Darussalam; 
Cambodia; PRC; Hong Kong, China; Macao, China India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; 
Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Lao PDR; Lebanon; Malaysia; Maldives; Mongolia; 
Myanmar; Nepal; Occupied Palestinian Territories; Oman; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; 
Philippines; Qatar; Republic of Korea; Saudi Arabia; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Syria; Tajikistan; 
   ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                                 Razmi and Hernandez 
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Thailand; Timor-Leste; Turkey; Turkmenistan; United Arab Emirates; Viet Nam; Yemen 
East and Southeast Asian 
economies 
Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; PRC; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Republic of Korea; Lao 
PDR; Macao, China; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Timor-Leste; Viet Nam 
   
COMTRADE = , GDP = , Lao PDR = , PRC = , SITC = , UK = , UN = , US = , WDI = . 
PWT: Penn WorldTables 
WDI: World Development Indicators 
UN: United Nations 




Some of the variables in our sample could potentially be endogenous in the sense that 
these are jointly determined with the dependent variable. For example, the share of 
industry in the economy may not be exogenous to the GDP growth rate. Moreover, some 
of the variables in our data are likely to exhibit hysteresis or persistence over time. To 
address the robustness of our baseline Ordinary least squares estimates OLS  to 
potential endogeneity and/or simultaneity issues, we carry out dynamic panel 
estimations using the Arellano–Bond two-step general method of moments (GMM) 
method. We specify the second and third lags of the dependent variable as instruments 
in addition to the third lags of  GDP prop Industry _ _ , GDP prop TB _ _ , 
GDP X Manuf _ _ , and  Developed X proportion _ _ . Consistent with our OLS strategy, 
we specify time and cross-section effects, and pursue a more parsimonious specification 
based on eliminating variables that are not statistically significant. The Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions is employed to test the validity of our instruments. 
It may be warranted here to revisit the choice of our main variables of interest, as 
included in equation 1. Our focus is on exploring the nature of Asia's growth strategy. 
More specifically, our focus is on whether Asian growth can be identified either as 
tradable led or export led (or both) and, if so, what implications does the past pattern of 
growth have for a future in which slower developed-country growth translates into more 
limited global demand. The motivation behind the inclusion of a proxy for the tradable 
sector is obvious in light of the discussion in section 1. If pre-crisis Asian growth was 
tradable led, then subsidies for tradable production for domestic consumption may be 
good substitutes for global demand in terms of boosting growth. If, however, pre-crisis 
growth was export led, then this may not be true and shrinking global imbalances and/or 
reduced global demand become a more serious concern. The trade balance as a 
proportion of GDP captures Keynesian demand-side net
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables of primary interest. Figure 3 shows 
the corresponding distributions with the help of histograms. 
 export-led growth stimulus. As 
discussed in section 1, this is only one channel—and perhaps not the most important 
one at that—through which exports could facilitate growth, and exports, especially 
manufactured ones, could be special for other reasons. This provides the grounds for 
including manufactured exports as a proportion of GDP and the proportion of 
manufactured exports destined for developed countries as explanatory variables. If 
exports to industrialized countries feature the benefits and positive externalities 
associated with knowledge spillovers, competition, learning-by-exporting, and quality 
control to a greater degree, then more limited demand from these countries in the post-
crisis environment could become a significant constraint on developing-country growth. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
                                                                                                          
 
15 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Statistics           
Mean  2.959  34.700  16.644  (0.228)  30.862 
Median  3.120  31.746  6.645  (1.933)  27.149 
Maximum  20.771  90.167  151.233  80.003  99.741 
Minimum  (23.472)  7.698  0.002  (75.379)  0.112 
Std. Dev.  4.446  15.163  25.891  18.248  21.963 
Sum  1,704.083  15,337.320  6,857.411  (113.198)  12,499.160 
Sum Sq. Dev.  113.640  101,395.000  275,514.800  164,838.600  1,948.831 
Observations  576  442  412  496  405 
Source: Penn World Table (2011), World Development Indicators (2011) and authors’ calculations. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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 Figure 3: Distributions of Main Variables of Interest 
 
Source: Penn World Table (2011), United Nations COMTRADE (2011), World Development Indicators (2011), 
and authors’ calculations 
Asia had an impressive mean growth rate of 3% per year in real GDP per capita  from 
1953 to 2009. The series ranges from a minimum of -23.5% (Lebanon 1989–1991) to a 
maximum of 20.8% (Azerbaijan 2007–2009). The Azerbaijan figure is the only 
observation greater than 16%. An overwhelming majority of the observations lie between 
5% and -5%. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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Industry as a proportion of GDP ranges from a minimum of 7.7% (Hong Kong, China 
2007–2009) to a maximum of 90.2% (Brunei Darussalam 1974–1976), with a mean of 
34.7%.12
The distribution of manufactured exports as a percentage of GDP is much more skewed, 
with most values clustered in the 0%–10% range and very few beyond 50%. The full 
range extends from a minimum of 0.002% (Maldives 2007–2009) to 151.200% (Hong 
Kong, China 2004–2006). Moreover, there is a significant difference between the mean 
(16.6%) and the median (6.7%), indicating that a relatively small number of countries 
pulls the average up; there are only a few values above 60%. 
 Most of the observations lie within the 20%–45% range. 
The trade balance as a proportion of GDP is centered around zero, as one would 
expect. The highest number of values lies between –5% and 0%. The values between –
40% and 40% include almost all the observations, although Lebanon in 1989–1991 had 
a trade deficit of 75.4% while Brunei Darussalam in 1977–1979 had a trade surplus of 
80.0%. The mean is a trade deficit of 0.23% although the median (–1.93%) suggests 
that a relatively small number of countries with large surpluses characterizes the 
series.13
The proportion of manufactured exports that is destined for developed countries ranges 
from almost zero (for Bhutan in 2004–2006) to almost 100% (for Maldives in 2004–
2006). Bhutan is a landlocked country that exports almost exclusively to its South Asian 
neighbors India and Bangladesh. Very few values lie outside the 0%–60% range; the 
mean is almost 31%. Since Japan itself is an Asian country, albeit a high-income 
industrialized one, we exclude it from the list of industrialized countries while calculating 
the series 
 
Developed X proportion _ _ . As a robustness test, we also then estimate 
regressions with Japan included among the industrialized countries (section 4), and 
show that such a change does not qualitatively affect our results. If Japan is included, 
however, the mean of this series rises to 37%. Moreover, the inclusion of Japan makes 
50%–60% the most populated segment of the distribution. 
Returning to our econometric analysis, once we have explored the nature of Asian 
growth in the past, we then dig deeper by investigating possible channels through which 
various factors could have fostered growth. We focus on gross fixed capital formation 
(as a proportion of GDP), capital goods imports (as a proportion of GDP), and a 
Herfindahl–Hirschmann index of export concentration as the possible channels. 14 
Investment is a channel that is widely associated with growth in general, and in the 
Asian case in particular. 15
                                                 
12Services contributed more than 90% of the Hong Kong, China value-added figure during this period.  
 Imports of sophisticated capital goods (mainly from 
industrialized countries) often constitute a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
technological upgrading and productivity growth. Moreover, exports to developed 
countries may boost imports from these countries for two reasons. First, such exports 
relax bilateral trade balance constraints, enabling easier access to imports. Second, to 
the extent that such exports adhere to higher quality standards and are technologically 
more sophisticated, these are likely to require sophisticated capital goods imports to a 
greater degree. Finally, recent literature has found that low-income countries tend to 
diversify during their development phase, and that diversification may be a channel for 
13There was one value that was so implausibly high that we excluded it from the outset—the trade deficit to 
GDP ratio for Kazakhstan was reported as 10,133% for 1989–1991. 
14Data for the first two variables come  from the WDI while data for the third variable originate from 
UNCTAD’s UNCTADSTAT online database. 
15On this note, see Rodrik (1995). ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 




4.  ESTIMATES 
 We, therefore, explore the impact of our variables of interest on 
export concentration. 
4.1  Baseline regressions 
Columns 1–3 of Table 4 present the results of our baseline OLS regressions, proceeding 
from the most general form based on equation (baseline1) to more specific and 
parsimonious specifications based on the strategy discussed earlier. The upper half of 
the table reports the individual coefficient estimates while the lower half details the 
summed coefficients along with their statistical significance, where applicable (i.e., only 
in the cases where more than one of the contemporary and lagged instances of a 
variable form part of the reported specification). Consistent with standard expectations, 
the convergence term (LRGDPCHT ) has a negative sign and is generally significant at 
the 1% level.17
GDP prop Industry _ _
 The most general form in column 1 has few significant coefficients (the 
contemporary coefficient of  , the first lagged coefficient of 
GDP X Manuf _ _ , and the second lagged coefficients of  GDP X Manuf _ _  and 
Developed X proportion _ _ ). This is perhaps due to the number of lags specified which 
limits an already somewhat small panel. Column 2 reports estimates for the more 
specific form. Only the contemporary and lagged instances of  GDP prop Indus _ _  and 
the twice-lagged  Developed X proportion _ _  survive. Thus, 
Developed X proportion _ _ tends to affect growth with two lags. Moreover, the Wald 
test indicates that the summed coefficient of  GDP prop Indus _ _  is not significant at the 
10% level. None of the instances of the other two variables  GDP prop TB _ _  and 
GDP X Manuf _ _  have a statistically significant effect on output growth. 
                                                 
16See, for example, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and Cadot, Carrére, and Strauss-Kahn (2009). For the growth 
effects of diversification, see Agosin (2009). 
17This remains true for most of the regressions reported in table 4, although the magnitude of the estimated 
effect varies. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)
a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM GMM GMM
Baseline Specific I Specific II Specific I Baseline Specific I Specific II
Standardized variables
Constant 0.1799 0.2462*** 0.3369***
(1.52) (3.67) (4.16)
GRGDPCH t-1 0.0227 0.1320* 0.1619***
(0.13) (1.76) (2.49)
Ln RGDPCH t-1 -0.0236 -0.0300*** -0.0444*** -1.0024*** -0.0249 -0.0217* -0.0422***
(-1.64) (-3.67) (-4.02) (-4.02) (-1.08) (-1.78) (-3.97)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP 0.0032** 0.0033*** 0.0017*** 1.0023*** 0.0034
(2.28) (2.60) (2.67) (2.67) (1.47)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.0013 -0.0024*** -0.7569*** -0.0064** -0.0013*
(-0.85) (-2.49) (-2.49) (-2.37) (-1.66)




MANUF_X_GDP t-1 0.0011** 0.0032** 0.0021**
(2.37) (2.24) (2.37)




TB_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.0009 0.0003
(-1.35) (-0.19)




PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-1 0.0150 0.1997*
(0.54) (1.75)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-2 0.0261** 0.0336** 0.0413*** 0.1746*** -0.0142 0.0753*** 0.0641***
(2.31) (2.40) (4.11) (2.40) (-0.23) (2.61) (2.44)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
LnINDt + LnINDt-1 + LnINDt-2 0.0012 0.0150 0.2454 -0.0011
Wald statistic 2.91 1.24 1.24 0.36
p-value [0.090] [0.266] [0.266] [0.549]
LnMANt + LnMANt-1 + LnMANt-2 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0003
Wald statistic 0.52 0.28 1.54
p-value [0.471] [0.598] [0.216]
LnTBt + LnTBt-1 + LnTBt-2 -0.0006 0.0001
Wald statistic 1.84 0.04
p-value [0.176] [0.848]
LnPROt + LnPROt-1 + LnPROt-2 0.0378 -0.0065
Wald statistic 2.40 0.01
p-value [0.122] [0.927]
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.50 0.57 0.57
J-statistic 16.69 32.89 23.14
Instrument rank 41 40 34
Sargan test (p-value) 0.34 0.06 0.23
Cross-sections included 29 33 33 33 25 27 34
Observations 209 252 258 258 149 172 237
a(t-statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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Column 3 reports the results of a regression similar to that reported in column 2 but with 
the lagged instance of  GDP prop Industry _ _  eliminated. The contemporary coefficient 
on this variable is positive and significant. Moreover, the coefficient on the twice-lagged 
instance of  Developed X proportion _ _  is still positive and significant, and somewhat 
larger in magnitude.  
To facilitate comparison, column 4 presents the standardized 
GDP prop Industry _ _
coefficients based on the 
specific regression in column 2. The combined long-run effect (sum of coefficients), with 
a summed value of 0.246, is larger for  , although recall that the 
Wald test for joint significance indicates that it is not significant at the 10% level. Thus, 
the proportion of total exports to developed countries appears as the only significant 
variable. A one  standard deviation variation in this variable boosts growth by 0.175 
standard deviations.  
Columns 5–7 present the results of the robustness tests using the GMM approach, as 
described earlier. With this approach, we can address persistence by including the 
lagged dependent variable.18 Column 5 reports the most general regression, which 
again yields very few significant variables. 19
Developed X proportion _ _
 Moving to the more parsimonious 
regression reported in column 6, the second lag of   turns 
out to be significant again, and the effect is larger than in the OLS case. The first lag of 
GDP prop Industry _ _  is barely significant at the 10% level but appears with a negative 
sign and a small coefficient. Interestingly, first and second lags of  GDP X Manuf _ _  
now become individually significant, although the Wald test indicates that the sum of the 
two variables can be rejected at traditional levels of significance. Column 7 presents the 
GMM equivalent of the OLS regression reported in column 3. Only the second lag of 
Developed X proportion _ _  has a positive and significant effect. The Sargan tests of 
overidentifying restrictions, reported for all three regressions, do not raise any concerns 
at the 5% level of significance. 
In summary, both the OLS and GMM approaches suggest that, of the variables included 
in our benchmark regression, only the second lag of  Developed X proportion _ _  has 
had a positive and significant long-run effect on per capita GDP growth in Asian 
countries. The coefficient on this variable is larger in the GMM regressions. The role of 
the share of industry in GDP is less clear, with the standardized OLS estimates showing 
a positive effect that is larger than that of  Developed X proportion _ _ , but is jointly 
insignificant. The trade balance as a proportion of GDP does not appear to affect growth 
in any of the regressions. 
4.2  Taking the Asian financial crisis into account 
As is well known, the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999, which began with a 
speculative run on the baht and quickly spread to other parts of Asia, had a negative 
impact on income and employment. Does this effect show up in our data? To explore 
                                                 
18The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor means that the long-run coefficient for each 
variable now is the sum of coefficients on that variable divided by 1 minus the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable. 
19Notice that we are down to 149 observations in this case. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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this dimension more directly,20
Developed X proportion _ _
 we re-ran the baseline regressions with a dummy for 
1998–2000. Time-fixed effects were now excluded from the model in equation 1 for 
obvious reasons. Again, we estimated using both OLS and GMM techniques; Table 5 
summarizes the results. As expected, the Asian crisis had a negative and significant 
impact on Asian growth regardless of the estimation technique. The coefficient on this 
dummy variable ranges from –0.02 to –0.04. The first lag of Industry as a proportion of 
GDP has a negative effect, although it is statistically insignificant in the OLS case. There 
is a positive and significant positive contemporary effect which is more than offset by the 
lagged effect. Interestingly, the inclusion of the dummy increases the impact of the 
second lag of  . This is true for both the OLS and GMM 
estimates..In qualitative terms, the only difference from the baseline regression is that 
the second lag of the trade balance also now becomes significant, indicating that trade 
surpluses have a positive impact on future growth. Again, this is true regardless of the 
estimation technique. 
                                                 
20Notice that the time-fixed effects in earlier specifications should capture this Asia-wide shock.  In our 
baseline regression, the time-fixed effect is the largest for 1998–2000, and is –0.025 in magnitude. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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Table 5: Growth Regressions that Include an Asian Crisis Dummy, 1953–2009 
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP chain per capita) 
a 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
OLS  OLS  GMM  GMM 
General  Specific   General  Specific  
Constant  0.1512*  0.2004*** 
(1.88)  (3.29) 
GRGDPCH   t-1  -0.0018  0.1138* 
(-0.01)  (1.90) 
Ln RGDPCH   t-1  -0.0182*  -0.0211***  -0.0296**  -0.0185* 
(-1.70)  (-2.61)  (-2.16)  (-1.77) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP  0.0035***  0.0023***  0.0032 
(3.07)  (3.35)  (1.40) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP   t-1  -0.0010  -0.0046**  -0.0022*** 
(-0.77)  (-2.38)  (-3.00) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP   t-2  -0.0018*  -0.0026***  0.0013 
(-1.92)  (-3.53)  (0.63) 
MANUF_X_GDP  -0.0006  -0.0012 
(-1.54)  (-1.23) 
MANUF_X_GDP   t-1  0.0010**  0.0017 
(2.14)  (1.44) 
MANUF_X_GDP   t-2  -0.0005  -0.0005 
(-1.54)  (-0.51) 
TB_PROP_GDP  -0.0004  -0.0003 
(-0.95)  (-0.35) 
TB_PROP_GDP   t-1  -0.001  -0.0007 
(-1.63)  (-0.82) 
TB_PROP_GDP   t-2  0.0011***  0.0006***  0.0011**  0.0007** 
(4.02)  (3.80)  (2.22)  (2.55) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED  -0.0153  -0.1118** 
(-0.67)  (-1.98) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED   t-1  0.0086  0.1024 
(0.31)  (1.24) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED   t-2  0.0518***  0.0647***  0.0513  0.0877*** 
(3.5212)  (5.27)  (0.96)  (4.12) 
ASIAN_CRISIS (PERIOD 1998-2000 =1)  -0.0289***  -0.0293***  -0.0221*  -0.0402*** 
(-5.47)  (-11.14)  (-1.80)  (-5.30) 
Country Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
 LnIND  t   + LnIND  t-1   + LnIND  t-2  0.0007  -0.0003  -0.0002 
Wald statistic  0.99  0.755  0.019 
p-value  [0.322]  [0.386]  [0.890] 
LnMAN  t   + LnMAN  t-1   + LnMAN  t-2  -0.0000  0.0000 
Wald statistic  0.07  0.001 
p-value  [0.797]  [0.973] 
LnTB  t   + LnTB  t-1   + LnTB  t-2  -0.0002  0.0000 
Wald statistic  0.37  0.02 
p-value  [0.543]  [0.883] 
LnPRO  t   + LnPRO  t-1   + LnPRO  t-2  0.0451  0.0418 
Wald statistic  5.66  0.728 
p-value  [0.018]  [0.395] 
Adjusted R-squared  0.55  0.53 
J-statistic  18.55  19.94 
Instrument rank  29  28 
Sargan test (p-value)  0.18  0.34 
Cross-sections included  29  33  25  27 
Observations  209  229  149  163 
a 
(  t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 




4.3  Including Japan 
We mentioned earlier that we excluded Japan from the list of industrialized countries 
while calculating the variable  Developed X proportion _ _ . Exports to Japan have been 
a major area of growth for East and Southeast Asian countries in particular, but also 
other Asian developing countries in general. Are our estimates robust to the inclusion of 
Japan in the list of developed countries? Table 6 addresses this question. Starting with 
the estimates derived without controlling for the Asian crisis (columns 1 and 2), notice 
first that the second lag of  Developed X proportion _ _  continues to be positively and 
significantly associated with growth (column 2). Second,  GDP prop Industry _ _  also 
has a positive effect but, just as in the baseline case (column 2 of Table 4), the overall 
effect is statistically insignificant. The other two variables representing the trade balance 
and the manufactured exports' share of GDP continue to be insignificant, as in the 
baseline case. The inclusion of a dummy variable for the Asian crisis increases the 
positive effect of (twice-lagged)  Developed X proportion _ _  and, as in the case of 
Table 5, also renders the effect of the trade balance positive and significant, but the 
other results remain qualitatively the same. Reassuringly, the inclusion of Japan does 
not appear to affect our results much. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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Table 6: Growth Regressions Run After Including Japan as a Destination 




Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP chain per capita) 
a 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dummy Asian Crisis  Dummy Asian Crisis 
General  Specific   General  Specific  
Constant  0.1746  0.2462***  0.1340  0.1719*** 
(1.38)  (3.59)  (1.61)  (2.96) 
Ln RGDPCH   t-1  -0.0232  -0.0300***  -0.0162  -0.0174** 
(-1.53)  (-3.56)  (-1.46)  (-2.20) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP  0.0032**  0.0033***  0.0035***  0.0023*** 
(2.32)  (2.67)  (3.13)  (3.50) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP   t-1  -0.0012  -0.0025**  -0.0010 
(-0.80)  (-2.55)  (-0.75) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP   t-2  -0.0007  -0.0018*  -0.0027*** 
(-0.63)  (-1.89)  (-3.71) 
MANUF_X_GDP  -0.0006  -0.0006 
(-1.53)  (-1.50) 
MANUF_X_GDP   t-1  0.0011**  0.0010** 
(2.33)  (2.09) 
MANUF_X_GDP   t-2  -0.0008**  -0.0005 
(-2.17)  (-1.40) 
TB_PROP_GDP  -0.0003  -0.0004 
(-0.59)  (-1.02) 
TB_PROP_GDP   t-1  -0.0009  -0.001 
(-1.38)  (-1.61) 
TB_PROP_GDP   t-2  0.0005  0.0011***  0.0006*** 
(1.48)  (3.90)  (3.67) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED  -0.0023  -0.0058 
(-0.10)  (-0.25) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED   t-1  0.0110  -0.0034 
(0.34)  (-0.13) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED   t-2  0.0220  0.0249*  0.0492***  0.0530*** 
(1.63)  (1.81)  (3.28)  (4.58) 
ASIAN_CRISIS (PERIOD 1998-2000 =1)  -0.0294***  -0.0285*** 
(-5.78)  (-10.21) 
Time Dummies  yes  yes  no  no 
Country Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
 LnIND  t   + LnIND  t-1   + LnIND  t-2  0.0013  0.0009  0.0007  -0.0004 
Wald statistic  3.47  2.02  0.92  1.15 
p-value  [0.07]  [0.157]  [0.338]  [0.285] 
LnMAN  t   + LnMAN  t-1   + LnMAN  t-2  -0.0002  0.0000 
Wald statistic  0.58  0.03 
p-value  [0.446]  [0.852] 
LnTB  t   + LnTB  t-1   + LnTB  t-2  -0.0007  -0.0003 
Wald statistic  2.15  0.51 
p-value  [0.144]  [0.476] 
LnPRO  t   + LnPRO  t-1   + LnPRO  t-2  0.0307  0.04 
Wald statistic  1.35  3.71 
p-value  [0.247]  [0.056] 
Adjusted R-squared  0.56  0.50  0.54  0.52 
Cross-sections included  29  33  29  33 
Observations  209  252  209  229 
a 
(  t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 




4.4  Regional and temporal asymmetries 
Much of the debate surrounding global imbalances and export-led growth has involved 
the East Asian tigers and the Southeast Asian export dynamos that followed their lead in 
what is sometimes called a flying geese formation. Do these countries behave differently 
than the rest of Asia in terms of our main variables of interest? To explore this possibility 
we divided the sample into East and Southeast Asian countries (ESE) on the one hand, 
and the rest of Asia (ROA) on the other. Columns 1–4 of Table 7 summarize the 
estimates derived for these groups. Focusing again on the parsimonious form estimates 
(columns 2 and 4), there is some evidence of differing behavior. While the industry share 
of GDP and the proportion of exports destined for industrialized countries both play a 
positive and statistically significant role in boosting real per capita GDP growth in the 
ESE countries, that appears not to be the case for the ROA countries, where only the 
coefficient on   GDP prop Industry _ _ is positive and significant. As is generally the case 
with our previous regressions, the trade balance and share of manufactured exports are 
either insignificant and/or have a negative impact on output growth. Thus, the main 
finding reported by Rodrik (2009), i.e., the existence of a positive association between 
the share of the tradable industrial sector and economic growth, holds for both groups of 
countries. However, we find that, for East and Southeast Asian countries at least, the 
proportion of exports destined for industrialized countries is also an important driver of 
growth. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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Table 7: Growth Regressions for Cross-Sectional and Temporal Subsamples 
 
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita) 
a 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
General  Specific   General  Specific   General  Specific   General  Specific  
Constant  0.0629  -0.0267  0.5464*  0.7107***  0.3417  0.1375  0.4634** 0.5973*** 
(0.29)  (-1.07)  (1.79)  (3.35)  (1.64)  (0.74)  (2.03)  (2.83) 
Ln RGDPCH   t-1  -0.0006  -0.0779*  -0.0963***  -0.0565**  -0.0211  -0.0495*  -0.0609 
(-0.33)  (-1.96)  (-3.48)  (-2.11)  (-0.82)  (-1.83)  (-2.57) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP  0.0048***  0.0011**  0.0025**  0.0022***  0.0072*** 0.0056***  0.0008 
(3.13)  (1.95)  (2.35)  (3.79)  (3.963)  (5.90)  (0.92) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP   t-1  -0.0043***  0.0006  -0.0021  -0.0004 
(-3.61)  (0.44)  (-1.10)  (-0.33) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP   t-2  -0.0000  0.0007  -0.0009  -0.0041***  -0.0010  -0.0007** 
(-0.05)  (0.61)  (-0.99)  (-3.53)  (-0.82)  (-1.98) 
MANUF_X_GDP  0.0001  -0.0005**  0.0000  -0.0005  -0.0010***  -0.0005*** 
(0.31)  (-2.54)  (0.07)  (-0.76)  (-3.47)  (-2.62) 
MANUF_X_GDP   t-1  0.0002  0.0013**  0.0020*  0.0010  0.0007*  0.0009*** 
(0.39)  (2.20)  (1.76)  (0.86)  (1.70)  (3.33) 
MANUF_X_GDP   t-2  -0.0003  -0.0011**  -0.0011  -0.0001  -0.0004 
(-0.65)  (-2.34)  (-0.91)  (-0.11)  (-1.40) 
TB_PROP_GDP  -0.0022***  0.0002  -0.0012*  -0.0011*  0.0004 
(-2.88)  (0.32)  (-1.72)  (-1.82)  (1.24) 
TB_PROP_GDP   t-1  0.0019***  -0.0025***  -0.0014**  -0.0012  -0.0011*  -0.0009 
(2.74)  (-2.78)  (-2.12)  (-1.66)  (-2.16)  (-1.15) 
TB_PROP_GDP   t-2  -0.0005  -0.0005  0.0008** 0.0015***  0.0002 
(-0.61)  (-1.04)  (2.4)  (3.46)  (0.38) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED  -0.0170  0.0155  -0.0157  0.0579 
(-0.27)  (0.38)  (-0.48)  (0.95) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED   t-1  0.0235  0.0373**  -0.0197  -0.0143  0.0283 
(0.75)  (2.57)  (-0.28)  (-0.43)  (0.77) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED   t-2  0.0271  0.0646***  -0.0317  0.0442*  0.0073  0.0334*** 
(1.24)  (3.69)  (-0.72)  (1.77)  (0.43)  (2.77) 
Time Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
 LnIND  t   + LnIND  t-1   + LnIND  t-2  0.0004  0.0039  0.0042  0.0015  -0.0007 
Wald statistic  0.59  5.68  9.66  3.64  2.06 
p-value  [0.44]  [0.02]  [0.002]  [0.057]  [0.151]  0.0004 
LnMAN  t   + LnMAN  t-1   + LnMAN  t-2  0.0000  -0.0003  0.0009  0.0004  -0.0005 
Wald statistic  0.003  1.30  0.35  0.51  3.04 
p-value  [0.955]  [0.257]  [0.556]  [0.438]  [0.081] 
LnTB  t   + LnTB  t-1   + LnTB  t-2  -0.0007  -0.0028  -0.0015  -0.00075  -0.0003 
Wald statistic  1.99  2.82  4.47  2.65  0.12 
p-value  [0.162]  [0.09]  [0.025]  [0.1034]  [0.726] 
LnPRO  t   + LnPRO  t-1   + LnPRO  t-2  0.0335  0.1020  -0.0358  0.0141  0.0935 
Wald statistic  0.84  32.37  1.08  0.22  3.22 
p-value  [0.362]  [0.000]  [0.30]  [0.640]  [0.073] 
Adjusted R-squared  0.70  0.59  0.51  0.33  0.56  0.60  0.67  0.6 
Cross-sections included  11  11  18  26  20  23  29  30 
Observations  95  116  114  222  119  149  142  160 
a 
(  t  -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
East and South-  Rest of Asia  1953–95  1989-2009 
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Columns 5–8 of Table 7 present results for regressions run with the sample period split 
into two overlapping periods: 1953–1995 and 1989–2009. The periods were allowed to 
overlap in order to have evenly split and reasonably large subsamples.21
GDP prop Industry _ _
 Our general 
finding that the proportion of exports sold in industrialized-country markets is robustly 
and positively associated with output growth appears to  hold only for the second 
subperiod (again, as always, with two lags). For the first subperiod, however, 
 and  GDP X Manuf _ _  are significantly and positively 
associated with growth. The trade balance variable is negative and insignificant in both 
cases. Thus, the proportion of exports destined for industrialized countries appears to 
have mattered only in recent decades. Given the small sizes of the subsamples, 
however, this evidence should only be seen as suggestive and preliminary. 
4.5  Excluding outliers 
Table 8 addresses potential concerns raised by the presence of outliers. One such 
concern is that our results could be driven by a handful of high-income oil exporting 
countries. Suppose, for example, that commodity exporters have, on average, a lower 
proportion of exports destined for developed countries. Since some of these countries 
are high income, and since high-income countries may, on average, grow more slowly, 
this introduces a bias in favor of finding a positive impact of 
Developed X proportion _ _ . Figure 4 highlights this concern. The points to the right of 
the $50,000 level of real per capita GDP almost exclusively represent observations for 
Qatar and Brunei Darussalam, two relatively small oil and gas exporting countries. 
Moreover, these two countries have a relatively low proportion of exports destined for 
developed countries. The first thing to note, however, is that this concern should be 
addressed in principle by our inclusion of a convergence term. Second, as seen in 
Figure 5, the negative correlation between RGDPCH  and  Developed X proportion _ _  
almost vanishes once we restrict the sample to countries below the $20,000 threshold of 
real per capita GDP. Re-running our OLS regression with this more limited sample 
delivers results similar to our baseline regression that includes all data points (compare 
column 2 of Table 4 and column 2 of Table 8). One somewhat minor difference is that 
the first and second lags of  GDP X Manuf _ _  now survive the reduction to a 
parsimonious form, although their sum is negative and jointly insignificant (as indicated 
by Wald tests). 22
GDP prop Industry _ _
 The only other difference is that the contemporary and lagged 
coefficients of   now become jointly significant at the 10% level 
(and remain positive). Thus, both the proportion of exports to industrialized countries and 
the GDP share of the industry sector now become positive and statistically significant 
determinants of per capita output growth. 
                                                 
21 Much less data are available for the earlier period so that, even though it spans more years, the number of 
observations is almost the same as the second subperiod. 
22 We also ran regressions with interaction terms to  explore whether the impact of 
Developed X proportion _ _  varies with real per capita GDP. The interaction terms were found to 
be insignificant. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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Figure 4: Scatterplot of RGDPCH versus proportion_X_Developed for the Entire 
Sample 
 
Source: Penn World Table (2011), United Nations COMTRADE (2011), World Development Indicators (2011), 
and authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 5: Scatterplot of RGDPCH versus proportion_X_Developed for 
RGDPCH<$20000 
 
Source: Penn World Table (2011), United Nations COMTRADE (2011), World Development Indicators (2011), 
and authors’ calculations 
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Table 8: Growth Regressions Excluding Outliers, 1953–2009 
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP  per capita)
a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
General Specific  General Specific  General Specific  Ge e a
Constant 0.1403 0.2751*** 0.1688 0.0266*** 0.1799 0.2625***
(1.42) (3.67) (1.44) (4.26) (-1.52) 4.34
Ln RGDPCH t-1 -0.0189 -0.0389*** -0.0222 -0.0331*** -0.0236 -0.0315***
(-1.36) (-3.39) (-1.52) (-3.76) (-1.64) (-4.36)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP 0.0035** 0.0049** 0.0032** 0.0026** 0.0032** 0.0024**
(2.18) (2.73) (2.24) (2.28) 2.28 (2.44)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP t-1 -0.0015 -0.0031** -0.0014 -0.0017** -0.0007 -0.0017***
(-0.79) (-2.31) (-0.97) (-2.49) (-0.85) (-2.70)
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP t-2 -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.001
(-0.79) (-0.60) (-0.62)
MANUF_X_GDP -0.0006 -0.0001** -0.0006
(-1.25) (-2.00) (-1.54)
MANUF_X_GDP t-1 0.0018* 0.0012** 0.0014** 0.0011**
(1.96) (2.24) (2.01) (2.37)
MANUF_X_GDP t-2 -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0006 -0.0007**
(-2.67) (-3.12) (-1.22) (-2.200)
TB_PROP_GDP -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0003
(-1.30) (-0.46) (-0.54)
TB_PROP_GDP t-1 0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.39) (-1.422) (-1.35)
TB_PROP_GDP t-2 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005
(0.89) (1.63) (1.51)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED 0.0075 -0.0014 -0.0034
(0.35) (-0.06) (-0.16)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-1 -0.0002 0.0169 0.0151
(-0.01) (0.59) (0.54)
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED t-2 0.0403*** 0.0387** 0.0234** 0.3373** 0.0261** 0.0372***
(2.891) (2.32) (1.97) (2.53) (2.31) (2.85)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
 LnINDt + LnINDt-1 + LnINDt-2 0.0009 0.0018 0.0011 0.0009 0.0012 0.0008
Wald statistic 0.58 3.41 1.34 1.24 2.91 1.56
p-value [0.446] [0.0648] [0.247] [0.266] [0.088] [0.212]
LnMANt + LnMANt-1 + LnMANt-2 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
Wald statistic 0.92 0.84 0.16 0.05
p-value [0.338] [0.358] [0.686] [0.471]
LnTBt + LnTBt-1 + LnTBt-2 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006
Wald statistic 0.14 1.32 1.84
p-value [0.712] [0.250] [0.175]
LnPROt + LnPROt-1 + LnPROt-2 0.0476 0.0389 0.0378
Wald statistic 4.01 2.533 2.4
p-value [0.045] [0.112] [0.121]
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.49 0.56 0.51
Cross-sections included 24 27 27 29 29 31
Observations 180 197 196 217 209 241
a(t-statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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As discussed earlier, and as highlighted by Figure 3, a few small open economies in our 
sample (mainly Singapore and Hong Kong, China but also Malaysia and Macao, China) 
have exceptionally high proportions of manufactured exports as a share of GDP. Could 
these historically fast-growing economies be driving our results? Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 8 present the estimates derived once we limit the sample to values of 
GDP X Manuf _ _  less than or equal to 60%. Again, the results are very similar to our 
baseline OLS regression 
Finally, we noticed while discussing Figure 3 that a few countries export almost entirely 
to developed countries. Could these countries be driving our results? To investigate this 
aspect, we re-estimate our baseline growth equation after excluding data points with 
GDP X proportion _ _  greater than 60%. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 8 present the 
results. Once again the estimates are very similar to those derived for the full sample 
(see column 2 of Table 4). The summed coefficient of  GDP prop Industry _ _  is not 
statistically significant, leaving  Developed X proportion _ _  as the only significant and 
positive influence on real per capita GDP growth. 
4.6  Channels of influence 
As a preliminary step toward identifying channels through which our variables of interest 
can influence per capita GDP growth, we regressed GRGDPCH  on up to two lags of 
three variables: (i) investment as a proportion of GDP ( GDP prop GFCF _ _ ), (ii) capital 
goods imports as a proportion of total imports  ports Total prop K _Im _ _ , and (iii) a 
Herfindahl–Hirschmann index of export concentration (CONINDEX ). The value of the 
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specifically, we estimated an equation of the following form: 
  (2) 
where again we include a convergence term and country and time fixed effects. The first 
variable,  GDP prop GFCF _ _ , has traditionally been seen as a determinant of output 
growth and hence does not require much explanation. Developing countries often 
                                                 























where  j H  denotes the index for country  j ,   is the total number of export products (SITC Revision 3 at 
three-digit group level), and  i z  is the value of export of product i  by country  j  . ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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require sophisticated imported capital goods during their rapid growth and 
industrialization phases. Capital goods imports, therefore, often serve the role of an 
important transmission channel. Finally, as discussed in section 2, several recent studies 
have found that developing countries tend to diversify during their development phase, 
only specializing once they have attained middle-income status. Furthermore, recent 
empirical studies have found some evidence of a positive effect of export diversification 
on growth. 
Column 1 of Table 9 reports the general form obtained. Column 2 reports the specific 
from derived after eliminating the insignificant variables. Again, the convergence term is 
negative and significant, as expected. The contemporary value of  GDP prop GFCF _ _  
is statistically significant and positive, as are the contemporary and twice-lagged values 
of  al_Imports K_prop_Tot  (the coefficient on the first lag is negative). Wald tests for joint 
significance indicate a positive and significant sum of coefficients for this variable. The 
contemporary instance of CONINDEX  is also significant, and positive, indicating that 
export concentration boosts growth. A look at the standardized coefficients in column 3 
allows us to compare the magnitude of effects. The total effect of a 1.00 standard 
deviation increase in investment as a proportion of GDP is to boost the growth rate by 
0.36 standard deviations, while a corresponding increase in the proportion of imported 
capital goods raises the growth rate by 0.24 standard deviations and a corresponding 
increase in export concentration raises the growth rate by 0.32 standard deviations. 
Thus, all three variables appear to play statistically significant roles in influencing growth, 
although our preliminary evidence suggests that export  concentration rather than 
diversification is associated with growth. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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Table 9: Growth Channels, 1953–2009 
Dependent variable: GRGDPCH (Growth rate of real GDP per capita)
a
(1) (2) (3)
General Specific  Standardized
Constant 0.6287*** 0.4572***
(3.79) (3.31)
Ln RGDPCH t-1 -0.0757*** -0.0592***
(-4.23) (-3.89)






K_PROP_TOTAL_IMPORTS 0.0972*** 0.0900*** 0.2583***
(6.00) (5.46) (5.46)
K_PROP_TOTAL_IMPORTS t-1 -0.0979*** -0.0852** -0.2614**
(-2.82) (-2.32) (-2.32)
K_PROP_TOTAL_IMPORTS t-2 0.0751** 0.0745** 0.2192**
(2.40) (2.26) (2.26)






Time Dummies yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes
GFCFt +GFCFt-1 + GFCFt-2 0.0012
Wald statistic 2.41
p-value [0.122]
KPROPt +KPROPt-1 + KPROPt-2 0.0745 0.079 0.2431
Wald statistic 5.11 5.01 5.01
p-value [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
CONt +CONt-1 +CONt-2 0.0460
Wald statistic 1.46
p-value [0.284]
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 0.64
Cross-sections included 35 35
Observations 198 240
a(t-statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
Source: Authors ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 




Let us turn now to the next link in the chain by looking at the effect of our main variables 
of interest on each one of the growth channels identified. We do this by estimating a 
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    (3)     
where  X  denotes either  GDP prop GFCF _ _  or  imports Total prop K _ _ _  or 
CONINDEX , depending on the equation estimated. Table 10 provides the estimation 
results for the specific equation in both nonstandardized forms (columns 1, 3, and 5) and 
standardized forms (columns 2, 4, and 6). A look at column 1 suggests that a positive 
trade balance is negatively associated with investment as a proportion of GDP, although 
the twice-lagged instance has a small positive effect. The negative contemporary effect, 
which dominates may indicate the heavy imported-good content of Asian growth. Not 
surprisingly, industry as a proportion of GDP has a positive and significant impact on 
investment. Much less recognized in existing literature is the positive and significant 
effect on investment of the share of exports to industrialized countries. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that exports to industrialized countries require more sophisticated 
production processes, and hence more investment, providing one transmission channel 
for our earlier finding of a positive correlation between this variable and output growth. A 
look at the standardized coefficients in column 2 indicates that the normalized effect of 
the industry share of GDP is greater than that of  Developed X proportion _ _ . 
Column 3 presents the most parsimonious form estimates with 
ports Total prop K _Im _ _   as the dependent variable. Somewhat surprisingly, industry 
as a proportion of GDP does not appear to significantly affect the proportion of capital 
goods imported. However, the share of manufactured exports does have a positive and 
significant impact. Moreover, the lagged value of the trade balance and the proportion of 
exports destined for industrialized countries also have important roles to play, in terms of 
both statistical significance and economic magnitude. This finding provides more 
empirical support for the hypothesis that exports to industrialized countries require more 
advanced production processes that typically require imported capital goods. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent variable: 
a 
Specific   Standardized  Specific   Standardized  Specific   Standardized 
Constant  4.1913  -0.1953**  0.2521***  -0.1112  0.4969***  0.2487** 
(1.48)  (14.11)  (7.75) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP  0.5152***  0.9494*** 
(5.85) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP   t-1  -0.0038**  -0.2626** 
(-2.46) 
INDUSTRY_PROP_GDP   t-2 
MANUF_X_GDP  0.0030***  0.6578***  -0.0016*  -0.1920* 
(7.25)  (-1.70) 
MANUF_X_GDP   t-1 
MANUF_X_GDP   t-2 
TB_PROP_GDP  -0.4292***  -0.9518***  0.0030**  0.2499** 
(-8.13)  (2.38) 
TB_PROP_GDP   t-1  0.0009***  3.7416***  -0.0039***  -8.4322*** 
(2.62)  (-3.73) 
TB_PROP_GDP   t-2  0.0543*  3.2772*  0.0000***  0.0571*** 
(1.92)  (5.03) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED   t-1  5.9136**  0.1582** 
(2.28) 
PROPORTION_X_DEVELOPED   t-2  0.0924**  0.1706** 
(2.33)  (2.33) 
Time Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
 LnIND  t   + LnIND  t-1   + LnIND  t-2 
Wald statistic 
p-value 
LnMAN  t   + LnMAN  t-1   + LnMAN  t-2 
Wald statistic 
p-value 
LnTB  t   + LnTB  t-1   + LnTB 
t-2  -0.3749  2.3254  -0.0009  -8.1251 
Wald statistic  47.23  1.90  1.35  14.00 
p-value  [0.000]  [0.1676]  [0.247]  [0.0002] 
LnPRO  t   + LnPRO  t-1   + LnPRO  t-2 
Wald statistic 
p-value 
Adjusted R-squared  0.79  0.79  0.72  0.72  0.83  0.83 
Cross-sections included  33  33  33  33  36  36 
Observations  256  256  280  280  246  246 
a  (  t -statistic), *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
GFCF_PROP_GDP  K_PROP_TOTAL_IMPORTS  CONINDEX 
Table 10: Proximate Determinants of Growth Through Transmission Channels, 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 1953–2009 ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 





Considering next the index of export concentration (column 5), three variables—
GDP prop Industry _ _ ,  GDP prop TB _ _ , and  Developed X proportion _ _ —have a 
negative effect on export concentration, although the summed coefficient of the trade 
balance variable  is not statistically significant. The results thus suggest that export 
concentration tends to decline with an increase in the share of industry and 
manufactured exports in GDP. Again, these results are in line with intuition, given that 
industrialization  and investment is expected to promote diversification of the export 
basket. What is less consistent with recent literature is our earlier finding that 
diversification is not positively associated with output growth, at least in the Asian case. 
In summary, Table 10 provides suggestive evidence for at least two channels underlying 
the positive effect of  Developed X proportion _ _  on growth. This variable appears to 
have a positive relationship to both investment as a proportion of GDP and the share of 
capital goods  in total imports. However, we do not find any effect of 
Developed X proportion _ _ on export concentration or diversification. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Our effort involves a rather ambitious question: is it likely that Asian countries will be 
able to pursue the pre-crisis patterns of rapid growth? To help tackle this question, one 
first needs to establish the characteristics of pre-crisis growth. We have attempted to 
explore the trade- and export-related characteristics. More specifically, to what extent 
was Asian growth tradable-sector led, net-export led, or export led in some other sense. 
As we have stressed, the answers have implications for a future in which industrialized 
countries are likely to grow at a slower pace and global external account imbalances are 
likely to shrink. 
We ran a series of growth regressions to derive OLS and GMM estimates, to test 
robustness for subsamples and to the exclusion of outliers, and for possible transmission 
channels. Our main finding is that the proportion of total Asian country exports destined 
for industrialized countries is the most robust correlate of real per capita GDP growth. 
The industry share of GDP, used as a proxy for the size of the tradable sector, is also 
positively associated with growth—indeed the standardized coefficient is larger than that 
for the share of exports destined for industrialized countries—but the overall effect is 
statistically insignificant in many regressions. The other two variables of interest—the 
share of manufactured exports in GDP, and the trade balance as a proportion of GDP—
generally appear to play no significant role in promoting output growth in Asian 
countries. We found some suggestive evidence that the proportion of exports destined 
for industrialized countries may have mattered more for East and Southeast Asian 
countries, a group that is distinguished by the high share of manufactures in exports.  
It is perhaps not surprising that for developing countries that are well inside the 
technological frontier, manufactured exports to industrialized countries can facilitate 
growth through knowledge and technology spillovers and the effects of international 
competition. Indeed, our main finding is consistent with the body of recent literature that 
has found some evidence for exports leading to productivity growth. Most of this 
literature, however, is based on firm-level data. We, on the other hand, find evidence at 
the macroeconomic or national level. Moreover, we find suggestive evidence that two ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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channels through which exports to industrialized countries may facilitate growth are 
those of investment and the import of capital goods from these countries. These findings 
have some important implications for the post-crisis global economic architecture. 
Most importantly, to the extent that our findings suggest some role for the size of the 
tradable sector in promoting growth, the post-crisis world could still witness rapid growth 
in Asian countries, albeit based on the growth of tradable production for domestic 
consumption rather than exports. Industry policy such as subsidies for tradable 
production will then have to substitute for export subsidies. Furthermore, policies that 
penalize domestic consumption in order to generate exports will have to be reversed in 
the face of shrinking external demand. Shrinking global imbalances need then not be a 
pressing concern. 
Our finding that the proportion of exports sold to industrialized countries is, among our 
variables of interest, the most robustly (and positively) associated with growth, however, 
has less sanguine implications. Since pre-crisis global imbalances largely involved 
industrial country trade deficits, a shrinking of such imbalances will almost certainly 
require a decline in these deficits. In principle such deficits could decline through greater 
industrialized-country export growth without a fall in import growth. However, add to this 
the near certainty that slow industrialized-country income growth will cause demand from 
these countries to grow at a slower rate and we get the implication that Asian exports to 
industrialized countries are likely to decelerate which, in light of our main finding, is a 
cause for concern. Put differently, the fact that subsidies for domestic tradable 
production and removal of penalties on domestic consumption may not be good 
substitutes for exports to industrialized countries magnifies the challenges facing 
sustained Asian growth in the coming years. Export-led growth v2.0 in this sense may 
not be a good substitute for export-led growth v1.0. 
Our study has focused on the growth determinants that relate to tradable and exportable 
sector issues. A more exhaustive analysis, beyond the scope of our study, will 
incorporate other variables that are typically seen as causing or hampering growth. It 
might also be interesting to extend the analysis to investigate whether other developing 
countries behave differently than the Asian sample that we analyzed. We hope to pursue 
these questions in future work. ADBI Working Paper 329                                                                             Razmi and Hernandez 
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